As Gadamer explains, Languages as they have grown up historically, with their history of meanings, their grammar and their syntax, can be seen as the varied forms of a logic of experience … The articulation of words and things that each language performs in its own way always constitutes a primary natural way of forming concepts that is much different from the system of scientific concept formation. What a linguistic community regards as important about a thing can be given the same name as other things that are perhaps of a quite different nature in other respects, so long as they all have the same quality that is important to the community.
For this reason, historical shifts in linguistic meaning reflect the needs of a community. And the influence also goes the other way. As we grow up into a language, we come to share in the interests and projects it embodies. Thus for Gadamer the fact that speakers in a given community tend to speak in the same way has a significance that goes beyond mere communicative expediency. It reflects the fact that they are engaged in shared projects and thus find many of the same aspects of their surroundings important. We may note, first, that Gadamer would agree with Davidson that the conventionalist picture portrays languages as unrealistically unified and determinate.
For Gadamer, languages, like cultures, schools of thought, and biological species, are fundamentally historical things. They are constantly evolving in response to changing circumstances and as such have no clearly demarcated boundaries. At the same time, however, Gadamer does not agree with Davidson that the language one speaks i. Languages, then, are individuated not merely by the words they attach to concepts, but by the concepts they express. People who use different words to describe the world may not only say things differently, they may have different things to say.
If languages were individuated only by the form of their expressions and not the content, then Davidson would be right to say that mutual understanding does not require a common language. Since the uniqueness of a word lies in the historically accumulated nuance of the concept it expresses and the particular aspect of reality it picks out, convergence on a shared set of terms is needed to ensure that partners in dialogue are not undetectedly employing different concepts and thus speaking at cross-purposes.
Of course, in many cases this common language is established ahead of time. If my wife calls to ask me to 48 Ibid. In other cases, however, the right words are arrived at only in the course of the discussion itself. Thus if our discussion is to be fruitful, if we are to avoid simply talking past one another, we must work out a common way of speaking about and thus of thinking about the relevant phenomena.
This may be some new set of terms, or we may simply use some of the old terms with somewhat novel, mutually understood meanings that are geared to our particular discussion. Until this common language is created, we will not be able to tell where our disagreement lies, or even whether we really disagree at all.
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Arriving at a new, shared set of terms will not only allow us to better understand one another; it will also put us in a position to better understand the subject matter. The new language that emerges from our dialogue will, if the dialogue is successful, be one that incorporates many of the best insights from both of our traditions. His account of how conversation, via the flexibility of language afforded by application, can create a new language that the interlocutors share is his attempt to explain how mutual understanding is possible in the face of conceptual differences.
Further, his account of dialogue as a site of explicitly intersubjective thinking imbues such differences with a fundamentally positive import.
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Conceptual and linguistic differences, on his picture, are not simply obstacles to be overcome on the way to communicative understanding; they constitute opportunities for the interlocutors to expand their horizons and come to understand the subject matter better than they did before. The issue of understanding across conceptual difference, of course, is one that any theory of hermeneutics worth its salt must address, since it is a central aim of hermeneutics to explain how we can understand texts from historical periods and cultures that differ from our own.
Nor should it surprise us terribly that Davidson, whose philosophical heritage is not that of hermeneutics, but semantics and decision theory, largely ignores the question of how dialogue across conceptual difference is possible. Were this not the case, the theory would not, as he intends, be a theory of interpretation generally. One way to conceive of it one that both W. If this were a necessary condition of radical interpretation, then interpretations would cease to be radical the moment the interpreter made any progress, and the idea of radical interpretation as a procedure would be self-defeating.
Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding
Obviously, this is not a question space allows me to take up here. Why should bringing asymmetrical cases into our purview raise any new difficulties that the symmetrical cases do not already pose? Oxford: Clarendon Press, , Thus interpretation is always indeterminate, but only to an innocent degree. Indeterminacy of this kind cannot be of genuine concern. This unavoidable presupposition, Davidson argues, adds further restrictions on the range of acceptable theories over and above the restriction that theories must fit the behavioral evidence. In cases of symmetrical communication, it would seem, this principle is innocent.
Insofar as I already possess all the concepts deployed by the speaker I aim to interpret, the features of reality to which his words refer will be features I am prepared to identify and with which I am antecedently familiar. In asymmetrical situations, however, this is not the case. If the speaker is deploying a concept that is alien to me, then he is not responding to the same features of the world that I would be responding to under similar circumstances. He is, rather, clued into some aspect of reality that I have heretofore failed to take notice of, sensitive to some kind of objective similarity or difference that I am not yet sensitive to.
Thus here, it would seem, Correspondence will lead me to select theories that misinterpret the speaker over theories that correctly interpret him. In other words, one might argue that the empirical restraint on interpretation is sufficient on its own to separate asymmetrical cases in which Correspondence is not applicable from symmetrical ones in which it is. If this is correct, then the point above is moot.
He notes, as I have, that Correspondence is inapplicable to asymmetrical situations, and he similarly suggests that this casts doubt on the sufficiency of the evidence available to the radical interpreter. That is, the interpreter following Correspondence might simply find that he is unable to interpret those utterances of the speaker that employ unfamiliar concepts. A second line of response might point out that in asymmetrical cases Correspondence will not lead the interpreter to misconstrue every utterance of the speaker, but only those in which she actually deploys the alien concepts.
Many of her utterances, of course, will express only concepts that she and the interpreter share. At that point, however, an appeal to Correspondence or any other interpretative principle is otiose, since the relevant selections have already been made. For if an interpreter cannot tell ahead of time whether a given utterance expresses an alien concept, neither can he tell whether a given speaker possesses any alien concepts.
If Correspondence misleads the interpreter in some cases, then it is not reliable in any. To repeat what I said above, I do not think these considerations demonstrate that the theory of radical interpretation is unable to account for asymmetrical dialogues.
They show only that more work must be done to reveal how it can. Specifically, what is needed is to show either a that the evidence available to the radical interpreter is sufficient to determine meaning without assuming the validity of Correspondence, i. If neither option is successful, then the theory of radical interpretation is not up to the challenge posed by asymmetry, and we have reason to doubt its viability as a general theory of interpretation. We would also, I suggest, have reason to look to Gadamer for a way out of the difficulties Davidson encounters.
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Dummett, Michael. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The work of the philosopher Donald Davidson is not only wide ranging in its influence and vision, but also in the breadth of issues that it encompasses. The chapters in this boo Keywords: philosophy of language , philosophy of mind , philosophy of action , epistemology , metaphysics , hermeneutics , history of philosophy , social theory , analytic thinking , Donald Davidson. Forgot password?
Don't have an account? All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. University Press Scholarship Online. Sign in. Not registered? Such a balance between deep analysis and accessibility is rarely obtained, and it is one of the great merits of this volume. There is a philosophical vision at work in Davidson's thinking that exceeds in importance and attraction his masterly analyses of meaning and action even while it matches them in subtlety.
This volume brings that vision to the fore, engaging with it, as well as with other aspects of the Davidsonian position, in a way that demonstrates its intrinsic significance as well as its connection with the mainstream of contemporary thought. Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas. Search Search. Search Advanced Search close Close.
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