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This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Community Reviews. Showing Rating details. More filters. Sort order. Jul 16, Nick rated it really liked it Shelves: non-fiction. This book was great, however it did get a bit repetitive. The authors kind of started repeating what others in the book had said. This is a call to arms. We as the American people need to start being critical of our government representatives, and when they are not looking out for America's best interests we need to start getting them out of there. The judicial system in America has only gotten worse since this book was written.
Judicial Tyranny: The New Kings of America
This country needs to start making some changes or it is in trouble This book was great, however it did get a bit repetitive. This country needs to start making some changes or it is in trouble. Sep 22, Naomi rated it it was amazing. Excellent, excellent book.
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- Judicial Tyranny.
- Judicial Tyranny.
- Judicial Tyranny - The New Kings of America?;
Sears, Esq. Staver, Esq. Titus, Esq. More from this collection. Miracles in American History Vol. A variation of the shared responsibility model may go beyond consultation with the judiciary and may provide for joint responsibility of the judiciary and the executive for court administration. In conclusion, it can be asserted that the more involvement of executive and legislative powers in judicial administration the more potential threats exist to judicial independence.
Since regaining independence in , Estonia has tried out two different systems of judicial administration and is currently debating introduction of a third.
- Bill of Rights Institute.
- DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA.
- Judicial Tyranny - The New Kings of America.
Right after recovery of independence in , even before adoption of the Constitution, Estonia instituted the new court system. Estonia adopted a shared responsibility model of judicial administration quite close to the German version. The responsibility was divided horizontally leaving the Supreme Court outside the administration by the executive power and vertically leaving the majority of issues to be administered by the executive and only a few by the judicial power.
The courts of first instance the county court, or maakohus ;city court, or linnakohus ; andadministrative court, or halduskohus and courts of second instance circuit court, ringkonnakohus were administered by the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice approved the budgets of courts of first instance and courts of appeal; determined the territorial jurisdiction and location of, and the number of, judges in these courts; appointed the chief judge of a county or city court; and approved the rules of these courts and the land registries and registration departments in the composition thereof.
The initial selection of judges of courts of first instance and circuit courts was within the realm of judicial power—they were and are appointed to office by the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Riigikohus was and still is administered by itself and financed directly from the state budget.
The different model of administration for the Supreme Court was for the most part rationalised by the fact that in Estonia the Supreme Court has the authority of a constitutional court as well. For a decade, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice were engaged in discussion as to whether the model of judicial administration guaranteed enough independence for the judiciary.
Another proponent of greater involvement of the judiciary in judicial administration, Heinrich Schneider, suggested that the separation of the judicial power from the executive and the legislative power presupposes the organisational unity and integrity of the judicial power. Moreover, the judicial system should be independent in judicial administration, vesting the responsibility for judicial administration in a judicial body. Rait Maruste asserted in that in substance the Ministry of Justice was proposing a system of judicial administration that treats courts as adjudicative institutions of executive power that have the same autonomy in delivery of justice but that is subject to the control and supervision of the Minister of Justice in all its other activities.
The idea of greater judicial responsibility for judicial administration was countered by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice proposed a draft Courts Act that would leave courts of first and second instance under the administration of the Ministry of Justice. The only other aspect of independence deemed worthy of mention in the explanatory note to the draft was internal independence independence from judicial superiors and colleagues.
The new Courts Act was adopted on 19 February and entered into force on 29 July This act created the Council for Administration of Courts, and the system of judicial administration of courts of first and second instance shifted a little further from the executive responsibility model. From this point onward, the majority of the decisions of the Minister of Justice in judicial administration needed the consent of this council.
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Still the executive remained heavily involved in the administration of the first- and second-instance courts. And the judicial power continued to be unsatisfied with the situation. The document concerning these principles according to which the court system would be developed as an independent branch of power, for the first time in the history of the Republic of Estonia, set out the directions and objectives for that development.
The most important principles for the development of the court system were declared as being the following:. The court system operates as an independent power, responsible for the functioning of the administration of justice on the basis, and pursuant to the procedure, established by laws. To ensure development of the court system in observation of fundamental values and its functioning pursuant to established requirements, it is important to regulate the duties and structure of the court system, to develop the financing and administration of the court system, to deepen the self-managerial elements thereof, and to promote the personnel policy of the court system and training.
For further development in line with the principle of separation of powers, the administration of courts should be separated from the executive power. To guarantee the appropriate administration and development of courts, an independent administrative authority was to be established, to be part of the single court system in legal and organisational senses and subject to the management model of the court system as a whole.
In March , the Minister of Justice established a working group to prepare the amendments to the legislation regulating judicial administration and organisation. The Ministry of Justice will have almost no functions in judicial administration. At first glance, the draft appears to have the potential to be popular with the judiciary.
The Tyranny of the Administrative State - WSJ
However, in reality the overwhelming majority of the Supreme Court Justices and judges of the courts of first and second instance have opposed the draft. The opposition to the draft has several, very different sets of roots. The draft proposes that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may be, upon the proposal of the President, removed from office by the Riigikogu without the requirement of any reason being offered for this removal.
Yet, while such measures are not unfamiliar in the administration of executive power, the introduction of such measures in judicial administration creates unnecessary potential opportunities for executive and legislative power to put pressure on the Chief Justice—the head of the Supreme Court. Such opportunities are extremely dangerous Estonia, because the Estonian Supreme Court exercises the judicial review and has to check the constitutionality of the legal acts of the executive and legislative power. The greatest challenge to judicial independence is the close relationship between the executive branch and the judiciary, resulting in a lack of sufficient judicial independence.
This challenge can be seen in the pressures exerted on judges both by the executive branch and by higher-ranking judges. The draft allows:. This concept is again not unfamiliar in relations between managers within the executive power. And, of course, rigid hierarchy makes management more efficient. But within the judicial power such grounds for release create unnecessary potential opportunities for higher-ranking judges to exert pressure on judges, which has been criticised by many analysts.
The draft introduces an opportunity for a judge to be transferred from one courthouse of a court to another by the chairman of the court without the consent of that judge. If the power of transfer were to be in the hands of the executive, it would constitute a very powerful deterrent and sanction against a judge who does not conform to what the authorities may desire. But even if such a power is in the hands of the judiciary, it should be vested in a collegial body—at any rate, in the hands of more than one person.
The issue of the scope of administrative supervision over a judge by his fellow judges is becoming increasingly present as a subject of debate. This might have a chilling effect on judicial independence. On the other hand, absence of any control for fear of an adverse effect on judicial independence might militate against the efficiency of the justice system. Also, it might adversely affect public confidence in the courts.